DETERMINANTS OF THE' LEVEL AND DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILY INCOME IN METROPOLITAN AREAS, 1969
The level and distribution of family income in 1969 varied widely 1 across Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) in the U.S.
Stamford, Conn., had the highest median income, $15,862; Bristol, Conn., had the most equally distributed incomes, a Gini coefficient of .272. Of all the metropolitan areas, McAllen, Texas, was the poorest, with a median income of $4776, as well as the most unequal, with a Gini coefficient of .469. In this paper a model of the determinants of this variation in income levels and size distributions is formulated and estimated. The model emphasizes the role of the industrial structure of the area.
A MODEL OF INCOME DETERMINATION IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA Newhouse (1971) and Thurow (1975) both assign industrial composition a major role in explaining the level and distribution of income, even though Newhouse adheres to the 1abor-supp1y-oriented human capital theory and Tl\urow supports the 1abor-demand-oriented job competition theory. Newhouse asserts:
For the purpose of predicting area income distribution it may be best to treat the amount of human capital as a function of industry mix. If firms in an industry impart the same amounts of specific training but that amount differs by industry, the industry mix determines the amount of specific training in the labor force ..•• Since workers with large amounts of general education tend to be mobile and locate where highly skilled jobs are being offered, industry mix also plays a role in determining the distribution of general education among areas, (pp.-56-57) . i 2 For Newhouse, industrial location determines the supply of specific and general training in the area. Workers are paid their marginal products, which depend on their skills, so that in determining the wages. Newhouse assumes that a fixed proportion of an industry's jobs fall into specific income classes so that wage structures are constant across industries. He then argues that national unions, national product markets, and similar technologies produce a constant wage level for an industry independent of its geographical location.
In the job competition model, the individual's earnings depend not on his own endowments, but on the job he acquires. The marginal product adheres not to the person, but to the job. Labor demand, not the background skills of the labor force, determines the number and types of jobs that exist. Thus, the industrial mix determines both the wage level and the wage structure. These depend on technology, interdependent preferences, and customary wage differentials in .,the workplace.
Employers are anxious to establish wage structures that their employees regard as equitable since their profits depend on it. There is a profit maximizing wage structure, but it need not be a marginal productivity wage structure •••• The structure of wages is dependent upon the structure of interdependent preferences rather than upon the structure of marginal products •••• Given the need for production teamwork and the existence of interdependent preferences, wages are negotiated and set on a team rather than an individual basis ••.
• Team wage structures lead to different wages for the same skilL ••• The net result is a structure of wages that is often more homogeneous within firms or industries than it is within occupations (Thurow, pp. 108-109).
3 While Thurow does not claim to understand how "equitable" wage structures are established, he does point out that they remain constant over long periods of time, and thus are relevant to the type of shortrun model specified below.
Neither Thurow nor Newhouse predicts the effect of specific industries on wage levels and wage structure. Thus, one purpose of this paper is to estimate specific industrial impacts on metropolitan area incomes. The usefulness of knowledge about these impacts in formulat~ng an urban development policy is obvious. For example, if one industry pays very high average wages but distributes them unequally, while a second pays lower, but more equally distributed, average wages, this maỹ ose a difficult strategic problem for areas promoting economic growth.
Furthermore the two labor forces will require a different mix of public services and will represent different tax bases creating a complication for development strategies which is obscured by the conventional focus on the number of jobs or the total wage bill.
Without attempting to distinguish between the human capital theory and the job competition theory, a recursive model of the level and distribution of family income that emphasizes the industrial structure of the area is specified: Equations (1) and (2) In this paper, th~' industrial structure is proxied'oy the percentage of employment in each of the eleven industries listed in Table 1 .
The sum of the percentage employed in these industries plus the percentage listed as "industry not reported" equals 100 percent.
Suchan aggregation can test only gross effects of industrial mix, since, for example, both oil refineries and textile firms are classified under nondurable manufacturing. A more appropriate test of industrial influences would use data at the three-or four-digit level; such" a disaggregation, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
The quality of the labor force also affects the level and distribution of income. The educational composition of the labor force, the percentage of adults with less than one year of high school, and the percentage with at least a college degree, and the disability status of the population are proxies for labor force quality. It is expected that areas in which a larger percentage of.the population has completed college will have higher incomes, while those with a large proportion who are poorly educated or disabled will have lower incomes. Increases in all three variables should increase inequality.5
Wage differentials, due to discrimination or efficient screening by employers, exist by race and age. The greater the percentage of the population that is nonwhite and the lower the percentage of the population that is in the prime-age category (25 to 64 years), the lower will be average wages and the greater will be the degree of inequality.
The 1970 e~nsus reports Gin! coefficients for family incomes and for male wages and female wages. Gini coefficients for all wage earners are not reported. The data on industrial structure is reported as the percentage of the employed population in each.industry, so it. is this unreported Gini coefficient that would be the most appropriate dependent variable. Rather than compute these Gini 6 coefficients, family income was chosen as the basis for analysis.
Previous authors have also analyzed the distribution of family income (Farbman, Aigner and Heins, Sale) .
The percentage of total personal income from transfer payments and the percentage from property income are included to bridge the gap between wages and family incomes. Where a greater share of personal income is in the form of transfers, income, shouldbe'lower.and more unequally distributed. A higher share from property income is expected to be associated with higher but more unequally distributed incomes. Both of these sources of income are distributed more unequally than wage and salary income.
The female labor force participation rate is also included as a bridge between wages and family incomes. Where this participation rate is higher, it is expected that family incomes will be higher and more equally distributed, since the participation of married women falls as husband's income increases (Thurow, pp. 5-6).
The male labor force participation rate and the unemployment rate are indicators of aggregate demand. If the model were estimated using hourly earnings, these two variables would be unnecessary, since the industrial mix would proxy demand effects. Since the model refers to yearly earnings and since industry mix is exogenous in the short run, it is expected that higher male labor force participation rates and lower unemployment rates are associated with higher and more equally distributed incomes.
Population size and density are included to analyze familiar cdncerns in urban economics. Larger cities'are "eXpected to offer ecoI!.e1nie's of 7 scale up to a certain point at which negative externalities and diseconomies of scale offset the benefits of diversification and specialization (Hoch, 1972) . If the effect of population on income levels were negative, it would mean that cities were too large. On the other hand, a larger population might mean higher incomes, but might attract poor migrants, so that incomes rose but became more unequally distributed.
In an equilibrium urban model, larger and denser areas imply higher rents and transportation costs, implying that workers in these areas must receive higher incomes to compensate for these costs.
Finally, a set of regional dummies is included in the income level equation. Money incQme:;nJJottet'eal incgme~,;d.sr.Dur measurer,·1Sot r ., the regional dummies serveeasE:'p~iLc~! detfldtt6ts1o.: 6 It is assumed .~I that the regional influences affect all incomes within a region equally, so they are not excluded from th~income dist~ibution equation.
ESTIMATION OF THE MODEL
The two-equation model discussed above is estimated here as a reduced form. The income level equation (1) is substituted into the income distribution equation (2) for the median income variable. Then, the estimation of the Gini coefficient equation by ordinary least squares produces the total effects on the Gini of each independent variable. As discussed above, this total is composed of one effect that directly alters the income distribution and a second effect that operates indirectly through the variable's effect on the income ieve1. In such a model the direct and the indirect effects of an independent variable could be recovered from the two equations. For this to be the case, the disturbance term in the income level equation would have to be uncorrelated with the disturbance term in the income distributiop equation. However, if relevant independent variables have been omitted from the model, it is propabJLe that they, like the included variables, would influence both equations. Then, the omission of variables would mean that the disturbance terms across equations were correlated and ordinary least squares would produce biased estimates.
By neglecting the income level equation and by using ordinary least squares in a regression that includes the income level as a regressor, previous authors have obtained biased estimates of the di"rect effect of the independent variables on the income distribution. The approach taken here estimates the total effect of these variables without simultaneous equations bias. Volume, Table 236 ). Such compositional differences, however, may be due to industrial demands, not to the supply of ·characteristics in each SMSA, so they are appropriately included as industrial effects.
The educational composition has the expected effect on both the median income and the Gini coefficient. Larger and denser SMSAs have higher income levels, but neither size nor density significantly affects the income distribution. The squared term for population indicates that incomes rise up to an SMSA size of about 3.5 million and then begin to decline. The regional dummies reveal that the three southern regions have significantly lower money incomes than the other regions. Table 3 shows the magnitude of the effects of several independent variables on the level and distribution of income. Panel 1 of Table 3 shows the estimated level and distribution of income at several SMSA sizes for a high-incomereg'ion,.: the Pacific, and a ·low-income region, West South Central, when all the independent variables are evaluated at their s~mple means (as given in Table' ! 1) • The median income in an aver~ge SMSA of 2.5 million is about 9 percent higher than that in an SMSA of 250,000 and about 1 percent higher than~hat in an 12 SMSA of 5 million. Inequality is fairly constant across SMSA size classes but rises by about 3 percent in an SMSA of 5 million.
Panels 2, 3, and 4 ofi' Table 3 Tables 3 and 5 are between the two regions.
In the Pacific Region, incomes are about 17 percent higher and Gini coefficients about 6 percent lower than in the West South Central Region.
SUMMARY
In this paper a model wa·s developed that accounts. Notes: Number of observations is 222; t-statistics appear in parentheses below regression coefficients; a t-statistic of 1.96 is significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test).
The omitted categories are:. industry not reported, percentage of adults with between two years of high school and three years of college, percentage of total personal income from wages and salaries, and the Pacific Region. 2 The income distribution may influence aggregate consumption and savings, and, therefore, the income level (Blinder, 1975) . However, national capital markets should prevent differences in consumption and savings across SMSAs from influencing SMSA income levels. 3Farbman reviews several other studies that have estimated similar single-equation models for states. Also, see Aigner and Heins (1967) , and Sale (1974) . Holmes and Munro (1970) use a simultaneous equations model for Canadian regions; Schofield (1975) , for British regions.
4 A long-run model in which industrial location and labor migration are both endogenous is beyond the scope of this paper. Such models are, in fact, extremely difficult to estimate. See, Engle (1974) for an attempt to model employment and migration for a single metropolitan area.
.
The ommtted educational variable is the percentage of the population with between two years of high school and three years of college. This group accounts for about two-thirds of the population in an SMSA, so an increase in either tail of the educational distribution should increase inequality.
24 6 The Burueau of Labor Statistics publishes data on urban living costs for fewer than forty selected metropolitan areas. Hoch (1972) argues that most of the variation in these living cost indices can be explained by popu1atmon size and region.
7
The sum of the percentage employed in each industry adds to 100 percent. Thus, a one percentage po~nt increase in employment in each industry for a given SMSA refers to a constant number of jobs. However, since different industries have drefferent employment oases; .a 1 perc~ntage point increase in employment has a different effect on their relative shares.
For example, a 1 percentage point increase in employment in mining more than doubles the number of people in mining, while a one point increase in wholesale and retail trade changes employment in that industry by only about 5 percent.
8 Although the linear regression reported here accounts for a large portion of the variance in the Gini coefficient, a paradox is involved.
When some characteristic is in the minority (for example, being nonwhite or being a college graduate), it may tend to increase inequality. If this characteristic were to become the attribute of a majority, the effect on the Gini coefficient would reverse. This reversal forms the basms for the Kuznets hypothesis (Kuznets, 1955) . During the course of economic development, agricultural employment declines from a majority to a minority of the labor force. In the early stage, the movement out of agriculture increases both the income level and the degree of inequality. As the majority of the population joins the industrial work force, income·levels contin~e.toincrease, b~t inequal~ty b~gins~o decline. Nonlinearities for several variables were estimated,7.::but only the one for population was significant and is reported in Table e .
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